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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case
In his Appellant's Brief, Mr. Lundahl argued that the Idaho Supreme Court denied
him due process and equal protection when it denied his Motion to Augment the record
on appeal with a transcript of the probation violation hearing, held on July 13, 2010, and
the probation disposition hearing, held on August 31, 2010. Mr. Lundahl argues that the
requested transcripts are necessary for his appeal because the district court could
utilize its own memory of the prior proceedings when it executed a sentence after
relinquishing jurisdiction. In response, the State argues that the only relevant transcript
is the one from the rider review hearing based on the new standard of review articulated
in State v. Morgan, 153 Idaho 618 (Ct. App. 2012).
This brief is necessary to address the Morgan Opinion and the State's assertion
that the requested transcripts are not relevant to the issues on appeal. (Respondent's
Brief, pp.4-12.) Mr. Lundahl argues that the requested transcripts are relevant because
a district court can rely on its own memory of the prior proceedings when it makes a
sentencing decision.

Since Idaho appellate courts conduct an independent review of

the entire record when determining whether a district court abused its discretion in
regard to a sentencing determination, what was specifically presented to the district
court at a rider review hearing does not define the scope of review concerning the
sentencing issue. The only questions are: whether the information at fssue was before
the district court at any of the prior hearings, and whether that information is relevant to
the sentencing issues on appeal.
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Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
In its Respondent's Brief, the State argued that Mr. Lundahl could only challenge
the denial of his Idaho Criminal Rule 35 (hereinafter, Rule 35) motion as the notice of
appeal was timely from that order but not from the order relinquishing jurisdiction.
(Respondent's Brief, pp.12-14.) Mr. Lundahl then filed a motion seeking clarification of
appellate jurisdiction with the Idaho Supreme Court and asserted that his notice of
appeal was timely from the order relinquishing jurisdiction per the prison mail box rule.
(Motion for Order Clarifying Jurisdiction of Supreme Court and to Suspend Briefing
Schedule Pending Court's Ruling and Affidavit in Support Thereof, pp.1-5.) Thereafter,
the Idaho Supreme Court entered an order stating that Mr. Lundahl's notice of appeal
was timely filed from the order relinquishing jurisdiction. (Order, p.1.)
Otherwise, the statement of the facts and course of proceedings were previously
articulated in Mr. Lundahl's Appellant's Brief. They need not be repeated in this Reply
Brief, but are incorporated herein by reference thereto.
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ISSUES
1. Did the Idaho Supreme Court deny Mr. Lundahl due process and equal
protection when it denied his Motion to Augment with the requested transcripts?
2. Did the district court abuse its discretion when it relinquished jurisdiction? 1
3. Did the district court abuse its discretion when it denied Mr. Lundahl's I.C.R. 35
motion requesting leniency?

This issue was addressed in the Statement of Facts, supra. Otherwise, issues II and
Ill will not be addressed in this brief.
1
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ARGUMENT
The Idaho Supreme Court Denied Mr. Lundahl Due Process And Equal Protection
When It Denied His Motion To Augment The Appellate Record With Necessary
Transcripts

A.

Introduction
In Idaho, district courts consider a broad range of information when making

sentencing decisions.

Due to this broad range of information considered, Idaho

appellate courts have scrupulously required defendants

to provide an extensive

appellate record because they conduct an independent review of the entire record
before the district court when determining whether an abuse of discretion occurred in
regard to a sentencing determination. In other words, the question on appeal generally
does not focus on how or what the district court actually considered.

Instead, the

central question is whether the record before the district court supports its sentencing
determination.
Since Idaho appellate courts need to have all of the relevant information that was
before the district court to conduct this analysis, they will presume that any missing
information supports the trial court's determination and refuse to rule on the merits of
the issue. In some instances, the Court of Appeals has refused to address the merits of
issues on appeal due to the appellants' failure to provide transcripts of hearings which
were never discussed by the district court and occurred years before the disposition of
the issue on appeal.
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B.

In The Event This Case Is Assigned To The Court Of Appeals, The Court Has
The Authority To Address The Issues Raised In The Appellant's Brief

1.

The Idaho Rules Of Appellate Procedure Require The Idaho Court Of
Appeals To Address The Issues Raised In Mr. Lundahl's Appeal

In his Appellant's Brief, Mr. Lundahl argued, for the first time in this appeal, that
the denial of his request for the transcripts violated the Fourteenth Amendment's due
process and equal protections clauses. (Appellant's Brief, pp.4-17.) In response, the
State argued, based on State v. Morgan, 153 Idaho 618 (Ct. App. 2012), that the Court
of Appeals does not have the authority to address Mr. Lundahl's due process argument
because it would be tantamount to entertaining an appeal from the Supreme Court.
(Respondent's Brief, pp.5-6.) Contrary to the State's assertion, Idaho Appellate Rule
108 requires the Court of Appeals to rule on the merits of all cases to which it is
assigned by the Supreme Court. The relevant portions of I.AR. 108 state as follows:
Cases Reserved to Supreme Court. The Court of Appeals shall hear and
decide all cases assigned to it by the Supreme Court; provided that the
Supreme Court will not assign the following cases:
(1) Proceedings invoking the original jurisdiction of the Idaho
Supreme Court;
(2) Appeals from imposition of sentences of capital punishment in
criminal cases;
(3) Appeals from the Industrial Commission;
(4) Appeals from the Public Utilities Commission;
(5) Review of the recommendatory order$ of the Board of
Commissioners of the Idaho State Bar;
(6) Review of recommendatory orders of the Judicial Council.
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(emphasis added). Since the issues raised in his Appellant's Brief do not fall into any of
the foregoing categories, the Idaho Court of Appeals has the authority to address the
issues raised in his Appellant's Brief.
Further, an assignment of this case to the Court of Appeals functions as an
implicit grant of authority from the Idaho Supreme Court to review Mr. Lundahl's claims
about the constitutionality of the merits of its decision to deny his request for the
transcripts. The Supreme Court will be aware of Mr. Lundahl's due process issue when
it makes it decision to either keep this appeal or assign it to the Court of Appeals. This
position is bolstered by the Internal Rules of the Supreme Court. Specifically, I.R.S.C.
21, which governs the assignment of cases. The language of I.R.S.C. 21 follows:
Assignment of Cases. The chief justice (or designee) shall make the
tentative assignment of cases as between the Supreme Court and the
Court of Appeals. Copies of each assignment sheet shall be given to the
justices, affording each an opportunity to object and request the Court to
reconsider the assignment.

Any objection to the assignment shall be stated, with reasons, in writing
and circulated to all the justices.

At the request of any justice, the objection to the assignment shall be
taken up at conference.
The assignment of cases is not an arbitrary process; according to the rule, it is a
deliberate process which affords all the justices the ability to object and provide input
into the decision to assign a case to the Court of Appeals.

Therefore, the Supreme

Court will be aware of Mr. Lundahl's due process and equal protection arguments when
it makes the decision to either keep this case or assign this case to the Court of
Appeals. In the event this case is assigned to the Court of Appeals, the Supreme Court
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will be implicitly granting the court authority to address the merits of Mr. Lundahl's
claims of error.
Additionally, the State implicitly asserted that Mr. Lundahl should file a renewed
motion to augment the record with the Court of Appeals in the event this case is
assigned to the Court of Appeals.

(Respondent's Brief, pp.5-6.)

This assertion is

without merit because the Idaho Appellate Rules require all motions to be filed with the
Idaho Supreme Court. For example, Idaho Appellate Rule 110 states as follows:
All motions, petitions, briefs and other appellate documents, other than the
initial notice of appeal, shall be filed with the Clerk of the Supreme Court
as required by the Idaho Appellate Rules with the court heading of the
Supreme Court of the State of Idaho as provided by Rule 6. There shall be
no separate filings directed to or filed with the Court of Appeals. In the
event of an assignment of a case to the Court of Appeals, the title of the
proceeding and the identifying number thereof shall not be changed
except that the Clerk of the Supreme Court may add additional letters or
other notations to the case number so as to identify the assignment of the
case. All case files shall be maintained in the office of the Clerk of the
Supreme Court.
(emphasis added).

Furthermore, Idaho Appellate Rule 30 requires that all motions to

augment be filed with the Supreme Court. The relevant portions of I.AR. 30 follow:
Any party may move the Supreme Court to augment or delete from the
settled reporter's transcript or clerk's or agency's record.

Unless otherwise expressly ordered by the Supreme Court such motion
shall be determined without oral argument. The reporter's transcript and
clerk's or agency's record may also be augmented or portions deleted by
stipulation of the parties and order of the Supreme Court.
(emphasis added). Mr. Lundahl is not aware of any court rule which allows a party to an
appeal to file a motion directly with the Court of Appeals.
expressly prohibits such filings.

Idaho Appellate Rule 110

Therefore, the State's contention that Mr. Lundahl
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could have filed a renewed motion to augment directly with the Court of Appeals is
contrary to the Idaho Appellate Rules.
In sum, when the Idaho Supreme Court assigns an appeal to the Idaho Court of
Appeals, the Idaho Appellate Rules require the Court of Appeals to decide all issues
addressed in that appeal. Even though Mr. Lundahl is challenging the constitutionality of
the Supreme Court's decision to deny his request for the transcripts, an assignment of
this case to the Court of Appeals functions as an implicit grant of authority from the
Idaho Supreme Court to review all issues raised in the Appellant's Brief.

2.

An Assignment Of This Case to An Appellate Tribunal With No Authority
To Address Mr. Lundahl's Claims Of Error V\/ill Violate His Right To
Procedural Due Process On Appeal

In the event the Idaho Supreme Court assigns this case to the Court of Appeals
and it determines that the Court of Appeals does not have the authority to address all of
the issues Mr. Lundahl's raised in his appellant's brief, he argues, in the alternative, that
will function as a separate denial of his federal due process rights, which guarantee him
a fair appeal. The Constitutions of both United States and the State of Idaho guarantee
a criminal defendant due process of law. See U.S. Const. amend. XIV; ID Const art. 1
§ 13.

It is firmly established that due process requires notice and a meaningful
opportunity to be heard. Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545 (1965);
Cole v. Arkansas, 333 U.S. 196 (1948). The Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment also protects against arbitrary and capricious acts
of the government. Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420 (1980). Due
process requires that judicial proceedings be "fundamentally fair."
Lassiterv. Department of Soc. Serv. of Durham Cty., 452 U.S. 18, 24
(1981).
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State v. Card, 121 Idaho 425,445 (1991) (overruled on other grounds by State v. Wood,
132 Idaho 88 (1998)). Additionally, the Idaho Supreme Court has "applied the United
States Supreme Court's standard for interpreting the due process clause of the United
States Constitution to art. I, Section 13 of the Idaho Constitution." Maresh v. State, 132
Idaho

1, 227 (1998).
While there is no federal guarantee to an appeal from criminal state court

proceedings, after a state decides to provide appellate review, the due process and
equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment are applicable during the
entirety of the appellate proceedings. Griffin v. Illinois 351 U.S. 12, 18 (1956). In Idaho,
a criminal defendant's right to appeal is created by statute. See I.C. § 19-2801. An
appeal from an order relinquishing jurisdiction is an appeal of right as defined in Idaho
Appellate Rule 11.

"Relief from . . . [an order relinquishing jurisdiction] may

appropriately be sought through a direct appeal." State v. Urias, 123 Idaho 751, 754 n.1
(Ct. App. 1993).

Additionally, an appeal from the denial of a Rule 35 motion is an

appeal of right as defined in Idaho Appellate Rule 11 (9). See State v. Fuller, 104 Idaho
891 (Ct. App. 1983) (an order denying a motion for reduction of sentence under Rule 35
is an appealable order pursuant to I.AR. 11 (c)(6)).
In this case, Mr. Lundahl argues that due process protections apply to every
stage of his appeal. Those protections apply to any appellate procedural decision made
by the Idaho Supreme Court. Even though Mr. Lundahl does not have an independent
right to appeal from the order denying his motion to augment, he can challenge the
constitutionality of the order because it is a procedural component of his appeal and
the Fourteenth Amendment's due process clause applies to all procedures affecting his
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appeal. If the Idaho Supreme Court assigns this appeal to the Idaho Court of Appeals,
knowing that the Court of Appeals had no authority to reverse an order of the Supreme
Court, a unique and independent procedural due process violation will occur because
the Supreme Court will have precluded Mr. Lundahl from any state procedure by which
he could raise his federal constitutional claims challenging the denial of his motion to
augment.

C.

The New Standard Of Review Articulated in Morgan Is lnapposite As It Did Not
Alter The Standard Of Review Applicable When An Appellant Challenges The
Length Of A Sentence Which Is Executed After The Revocation Of Probation
The State argues that the requested transcript is not necessary for this appeal in

reliance on the new standard of review articulated in Morgan. (Respondent's Brief, p.8.)
However, the Morgan standard of review is only applicable to the question of whether
probation should be revoked and not to the question of what is an appropriate sentence.
State v. Hanington, 148 Idaho 26 (Ct. App. 2009), made it clear what standard of review

is applicable when the question on appeal is what the appropriate sentence should be
executed.

Morgan is inapposite as Mr. Lundahl is challenging the length of his

sentence on appeal.
The Court of Appeals' standard of review which is relevant to the length of a
sentence which is executed following the revocation of probation was articulated in
Hanington. In that case, the Idaho Court of Appeals resolved an ongoing dispute about

the proper standard of review in probation revocation cases.

Id. at 27.

Relying on

State v. Chacon, 146 Idaho 520, 524-25 (Ct. App. 2008), and State v. Coffin, 122 Idaho

392 (Ct. App. 1992), the State sought to limit review to only facts that had arisen
between the original pronouncement of the sentence and the revocation proceedings.
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Hanington, 148 Idaho at 28. Essentially, the State's position would have eliminated any

need for appellate courts to review the change of plea hearing transcript, the sentencing
transcript, and the presentence report because all of that information would have been
available to the district court prior to the original sentencing hearing. See id. Hanington
argued that the proper standard of review should include a review of "all facts existing
both at the time of the original sentence and at the time the sentence is ordered into
execution," relying on the standard established in State v. Adams, 115 Idaho 1053,
1055-1056 (Ct. App. 1989). Id. at 27. The Court of Appeals agreed with Hanington and
stated:
The State has read our somewhat differing versions of the scope of review
too restrictively. We have not intended to suggest that our review is limited
solely to events occurring between the original imposition of sentence and
the decision to order the sentence into execution. When we review a
sentence that is ordered into execution following a period of probation, we
will examine the entire record encompassing events before and after the
original judgment. We base our review upon the facts existing when the
sentence was imposed as well as events occurring between the original
sentencing and the revocation of probation.
Id.

The Hanington Court made it clear that when determining what sentence to
execute, the appellate court would review the entire record, including the factors at the
original sentencing hearing through the probation revocation before the court on appeal.
The rationale behind this clarification makes perfect sense when looking to State v.
Adams, the decision that explained why the appellate courts should look to the entire

record when reviewing the executed sentence:
[W]hen we review a sentence ordered into execution after probation has
been revoked, we examine the entire record encompassing events before
and after the original judgment. We adopt this scope of review for two
reasons. First, the district judge, when deciding whether to order execution
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of the original sentence or of a reduced sentence, does not artificially
segregate the facts into prejudgment and postjudgment categories. The
judge naturally and quite properly remembers the entire course of events
and considers all relevant facts in reaching a decision. When reviewing
that decision, we should consider the same facts. Second, when a
sentence is suspended and probation is granted, the defendant has scant
reason, and no incentive, to appeal. Only if the probation is later revoked,
and the sentence is ordered into execution, does the issue of an
excessive sentence become genuinely meaningful. Were we to adopt the
state's position that any claim of excessiveness is waived if not made on
immediate appeal from the judgment pronouncing but suspending a
sentence, defendants would be forced to file preventive appeals as a
hedge against the risk that probation someday might be revoked. We see
no reason to compel this hollow exercise. Neither do we wish to see the
appellate system cluttered with such cases.
Adams, 115 Idaho at 1055-56. As such, when an appellant challenges the length of

his/her sentence, the applicable standard of review requires an independent and
comprehensive inquiry to the events which occurred prior to as well as the events which
occurred during the disposition of the matter at issue. The basis for this standard of
review is that the judge "naturally and quite properly remembers the entire course of
events and considers all relevant facts in reaching a decision."

Id.

Based on that

presumption, the Court of Appeals stated that, "When reviewing that decision, we
should consider the same facts." Id. The Court of Appeals did not state that the district
court must expressly reference the prejudgment events in order for this standard of
review to become applicable. To the contrary, the Court of Appeals assumed the judge
will automatically consider the prejudgment events when determining whether to
execute or reduce a sentence.
The State also argues, in reliance on Morgan, that Mr. Lundahl was not denied
due process because he could have filed an objection to the record in order to get the
requested transcript.

(Respondent's Brief, pp.11-12.)
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In deciding whether Morgan's

rights were violated, the Court of Appeals held that because he could have obtained the
transcript without question during the objection to the record phase, he is precluded
from augmenting with those transcripts at a later stage in the appellate proceedings.
Morgan, 153 Idaho at .621-622.

However, this ignores the procedure the Idaho

Supreme Court has adopted and made available to all appellants to obtain transcripts
that are needed to complete the appellate record. See I.AR. 30. Idaho Appellate Rule
30 provides in part,
Any party may move the Supreme Court to augment or delete from the
settled reporter's transcript or clerk's or agency's record. Such a motion
shall be accompanied by a statement setting forth the specific grounds for
the request and attaching a copy of any document sought to be
augmented to the original motion and to two copies of the motion which
document must have a legible filing stamp of the clerk indicating the date
of its filing, or the moving party must establish by citation to the record or
transcript that the document was presented to the district court. Any
request for augmentation with a transcript that has yet to be transcribed
must identify the name of the court reporter(s) along with the date and title
of the proceedings(s), and an estimated number of pages, and must
contain a certificate of service on the named reporter(s).
Through this procedure, the Idaho Supreme Court has allowed all parties to obtain
transcripts that need to be a part of the appellate record. If one must have completed
the appellate record by the time of the settlement stage under rule I.AR. 28, then there
would be absolutely no need to have I. A R. 30. Idaho Appellate Rule 30 is there to
ensure every opportunity is given to provide a completed record to the appellate court.
As recognized in State v. Rae, 139 Idaho 650, 656 (Ct. App. 2004), the appellant could
ask to complete the appellate record by fifing a motion under I.AR. 30 to augment the
appellate record with the necessary missing transcripts.
Additionally, the State argues that Mr. Lundahl's arguments about State v.
Warren, 123 Idaho 20 (Ct. App. 1992), constitute either a "misrepresentation" by
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appellate counsel or a "misunderstanding" of the Warren Opinion because in Warren
the Court affirmed due to a lack of a more complete record and did not presume the
lack of irrelevant transcripts supported the district court's sentencing determination.
(Respondent's Brief, pp.8-9.)

Contrary to the State's assertion, Mr. Lundahl neither

misrepresented nor misunderstood the holding in Warren. In Warren, Mr. Warren was
convicted of aggravated battery in 1988 and placed on probation.

Id. at 21.

Mr. Warren's probation was then revoked and the district court retained jurisdiction for
180 days.

Id.

After completing the period of retained jurisdiction, Mr. Warren was

placed on another period of probation, which was ultimately revoked. Id. The district
court then sua sponte reduced the length of Mr. Warren's sentence. Id. Mr. Warren
then appealed and alleged that the district court should have further reduced the length
of his sentence. Id. In support of that position, Mr. Warren argued that his probation
violation was trivial.

Id.

In response to this argument the Court of Appeals held as

follows:
Warren incorrectly points to the nature of the probation violation by
arguing that his violation was trivial. This Court must look at the nature of
the original criminal offense, in this case aggravated battery where Warren
bit off his victim's ear. In regard to the character of the offender at the time
of the battery, the only fact in the record we have been presented on
appeal is that Warren had a drug problem. Warren "bears the burden of
presenting a record sufficient" for us to evaluate the merits of his claim.
State v. Wright, 114 Idaho 451, 453, 757 P.2d 714, 716 (Ct.App.1988)
(citing State v. Rundle, 107 Idaho 936, 694 P.2d 400 (Ct.App.1984). The
record on this appeal fails to contain the presentence investigation report
or transcript from the sentencing hearing on the battery conviction.
Without a more complete record and no argument by Warren as to why
the sentence was unreasonable we affirm the court's decision to reduce
his aggravated battery sentence to three years' fixed with ten years'
indeterminate. We also affirm the order denying the Rule 35 motion with
respect to this sentence.
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Id. (emphasis added). Mr. Lundahl recognizes that the Warren Opinion does not use

the word "presumption," but that distinction is inapposite when the cases cited by the
Court of Appeals in the foregoing quote are reviewed. For example, the Warren Cowi
cited to State v. Rundle, 107 Idaho 936 (Ct. App. 1984), which held as follows:
The burden of showing that the original sentence was unduly severe is
upon the moving party. When a discretionary decision related to
sentencing is challenged on appeal, the appellant bears the burden of
presenting a sufficient record to evaluate the merits of the challenge. E.g.,
State v. Wolf, 102 Idaho 789, 640 P.2d 1190 (Ct.App.1982). Here, the
record is fatally incomplete. It does not contain the original sentence, the
presentence report (if any) or a transcript of any proceedings related to the
original sentence. The record consists primarily of Rundle's motion, the
district court's order, and an affidavit, accompanied by a memorandum,
stating reasons for the relief sought. These reasons are largely limited to
averments that Rundle has learned his lesson about obeying the law, that
he has complied with regulations at the Idaho State Correctional Institution
and that further confinement would ill serve his rehabilitation or the welfare
of his family.
Id. at 937-38 (emphasis added). Rundle was cited in another Court of Appeals case,
State v. Fortin, 124 Idaho 323 (Ct. App. 1993). In that case, Mr. Fortin filed an Idaho

Criminal Rule 35 motion requesting leniency. Id. at 327-23. In support of his motion,
Mr. Fortin wanted to submit testimony from a person who was with him on the night of
his offense. Id. at 328. The Court of Appeals made the following holding concerning this
proposed testimony:
Fortin stated in his motion that he wished to present the testimony
of Darin Walker, who was Fortin's passenger the night of the accident.
Fortin did not, in his motion or by affidavit, inform the district court what the
substance of Walker's testimony would be. This Court will not disturb the
district courtrs discretionary decision without any evidence that the
proffered testimony was relevant. Fortin bore the burden of presenting a
sufficient record to allow judicial evaluation of the merits of his Rule 35
motion. State v. Rundle, 107 Idaho 936, 937, 694 P.2d 400, 401
(Ct.App.1984); State v. Ramirez, 122 Idaho 830, 839 P.2d 1244
(Ct.App.1992). Having failed to make such a record, Fortin has not shown
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that the district court abused its discretion by denying the motion without
admitting Walker's testimony.
Id.

(emphasis added).

In both Rundle and Fortin, the Court of Appeals held that it

would not review the merits of an appellate claim of error in the event the appellant fails
to provide an adequate record for review of that issue. As such, Mr. Lundahl was not
misrepresenting or misunderstanding the holding of Warren, when he argued that "the
Warren Opinion indicates that it would be presumed to support the district court's
decision to execute the original sentence," had Mr. Lundahl failed to request the
transcript at issue. 2 While the cases do not use the phrase "presumed to support the
original sentencing decision," Warren, Rundle, and Fortin all hold that an appellate claim
of error will not be addressed on the merits in the event the appellant fails to provide an
adequate record to review the issue.
The State also argues that the requested transcript was never presented to the
district court and, therefore, was never part of the record before the district court and
cannot be considered for the first time on appeal. (Respondent's Brief, pp.6-7, 11.)
Contrary to the State's position, the question of whether the transcripts of the requested
proceedings were before the district court at the time of the probation violation
disposition hearing is not relevant in deciding whether the transcripts are relevant to the
issues on appeal. That is because, in reaching a sentencing decision, a district court is

Subsequent opinions have refined this standard. ·For example, in State v. Coma 133
Idaho 29 (Ct. App. 1999), the Idaho Court of Appeals held, "[i]t is well established that
an appellant bears the burden to provide an adequate record upon which the appellate .
court can review the merits of the claims of error, State v. Beck, 128 Idaho 416, 422
(Ct. App. 1996); State v. Beason, 119 Idaho 103, 105 (Ct. App. 1991 ); State v. Murinko,
108 Idaho 872, 873 (Ct. App. 1985), and where pertinent portions of the record are
missing on appeal, they are presumed to support the actions of the trial court. State v.
Repici, 122 Idaho 538, 541 (Ct. App. 1992)." Id. at 34.
2
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not limited to considering only that information offered at the proceeding from which the
appeal is filed.

Rather, a court is entitled to utilize knowledge gained from its own

official position and observations. Downing v. State, 136 Idaho 367, 373-74 (Ct. App.
2001 ); see also State v. Sivak, 105 Idaho 900, 907 (1983) (recognizing that the findings
of the trial judge in sentencing are based, in part, upon what the court heard during the
trial); State v. Wallace, 98 Idaho 318 (1977) (recognizing that the court could rely upon
"the number of certain types of criminal transactions that [the judge] has observed in the
courts within his judicial district and the quantity of drugs therein involved"); State v.
Gibson, 106 Idaho 491 (Ct. App. 1984) (approving sentencing court's reliance upon

evidence presented at the preliminary hearing from a previously dismissed case
because "the judge hardly could be expected to disregard what he already knew about
Gibson from the other case"). Thus, whether the prior hearing was transcribed or not is
irrelevant, because the district court could rely upon the information it already knew from
presiding over the hearings at issue. Moreover, in Adams, supra, the Court of Appeals
presumed that the district court would rely upon such information and, therefore,
needed transcripts of the prior proceedings to consider the same facts presumptively
utilized by the district court.
Additionally, the State's position is unworkable because all transcripts, except a
transcript of the hearing from which an appeal is taken, would be deemed new
information. This is inconsistent with the holding from State v. Burdett, 134 Idaho 271,
276 (Ct. App. 2000), where the district court examined the defendant about his guilty
plea during the change of plea hearing. Since the defendant in Burdett failed to provide
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a transcript of that hearing on appeal, the Court of Appeals presumed that something
occurred in that hearing which supported the district court's sentencing decision. Id.
If the State's argument is taken to its logical conclusion, a transcript of a
defendant's original sentencing hearing would be new information in instances where an
appeal is filed from a Rule 35 motion requesting leniency.

Further, if that is new

information, a district court should not, absent a transcript, consider what happened at
sentencing when evaluating a Rule 35 motion. However, in State v. Wright, 114 Idaho
451, 452-453 (Ct. App. 1988), the Idaho Court of Appeals refused to address the merits
of an appeal from the denial of an

Rule 35 motion because the appellant failed to

provide the PSI and a transcript of the sentencing hearing in the appellate record. See
also State v. Rundle, 107 Idaho 936 (Ct. App. 1984).

In sum, the Morgan Opinion only dealt with an appeal challenging the district
court's decision to revoke probation. Hanington still controls the applicable standard of
review when a sentence is challenged on appeal.

As such, the requested transcripts

are relevant to the sentencing issue raised on appeal, and lack of access to those
transcripts will prevent Mr. Lundahl from a merits based review of his sentencing issue.
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CONCLUSION
Appellate counsel respectfully requests access to the requested transcripts and
the opportunity to provide any necessary supplemental briefing raising issues whict1
arise as a result of that review.

In the event this request is denied, Mr. Lundahl

respectfully requests that this Court remand this matter with instructions for the district
court to place him on probation. Alternatively, Mr. Lundahl respectfully requests that
this Court reduce the indeterminate portion of his sentence.
DATED this 13th day of February, 2013.

SHAWN F. WILKERSON
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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